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1. Introduction1
Regional failures, where multiple network elements in a region fail simultaneously, are usually caused by disasters 
such as earthquakes, hurricanes, weapons of mass destruction (WMD), etc. [1]. Such disasters precipitate huge 
amount of loss in optical telecom networks. For instance, in 2008 Shicuan Earthquake in China, 30,000 km of fiber 
cables and 4,000 of telecom offices were damaged [2]. Several studies consider such regional/disaster failures (e.g., 
[1], [3-5]), and aim to find the vulnerable parts of the network to disasters for analysis and/or design purposes. How 
to provision connections with the knowledge of vulnerable regions is a traffic engineering problem and we focus on 
this problem in this study. We explore the risk of traversing through these vulnerable parts in an optical network.
In statistics, risk is defined as the expected value of some outcome seen as undesirable. Ref. [6] proposes such 
risk model for transportation network in case of an earthquake. We propose a similar risk analysis for optical 
telecom networks in terms of penalty paid by network operator (NO) to the customers. This penalty is usually stated 
in Service Level Agreement (SLA) and expressed in terms of penalty per unit time when the down time exceeds 
allowed down time (ADT). We also discuss the probability of damage, probability of disaster, and number of 
possible events which should be taken into consideration.
In this study, our contribution is two-fold. First, we develop a probabilistic risk model to analyze the loss/penalty 
given the set of possible disasters. Second, we provide a traffic engineering solution for disaster protection by 
proposing a disaster risk-aware provisioning in optical telecom networks where we develop a mathematical model 
which reduces the risk and decreases the loss/penalty in case of a disaster. We formulate the problem into an Integer 
Linear Program (ILP). The illustrative numerical examples show that our approach reduces the risk by 6.5% with a 
slight increase in resources. We also provide a penalty model to compute the loss of NO in case of a disaster.
2. Risk and Penalty Model
We define the risk in Eq. (1) which captures the basic elements of risk analysis [7]: i) what can happen? ii) How 
likely is it that that will happen? iii) If it does happen, what are the consequences?
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where N is the set of possible disasters, T is the set of connections, ct is the cost of losing connection t, Zt
n is equal to 
1 if connection t is down in case of disaster n, pd
n is the probability of damage caused by disaster n, and pn is the
probability of disaster n. The term in parenthesis gives the loss if disaster n happens. ct gives us the benefit of 
differentiating between connections (e.g., some connections might be more valuable to lose than other connections).
We provide the following penalty model which NO should pay in case of a disaster. Let hr and h
t
adt denote the 
average recovery time from a disaster (which might take weeks) and ADT of connection t which is specified in 
SLA. The penalty in case of disaster n can be formulated as
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1 This work has been supported by the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) Program “Network Adaptability from WMD Disruption and 
Cascading Failures”. 
3. Disaster Risk-Aware Provisioning (D-RAP)
Our objective in provisioning a set of connection requests (with knowledge of set of possible disasters with their 
probability and possible damages) is minimizing the risk in Eq. (1) so that we can minimize the penalty in case of a 
disaster. We formally state the problem of disaster risk-aware provisioning and formulate the problem into an ILP 
approach for 1+1 dedicated protection (where connections are routed over a primary path and a dedicated link-
disjoint backup path) as shown below. Note that equations can be modified easily for other protection schemes.
Given:
 G(V, E): Network topology.
 T = {t = < st, dt, ct >}: Set of connections with source (st), destination (dt), and cost of losing connection (ct).
 Wij : Number of channels on link (i, j)
 N = {n = < Ln , pn, pdn >} : set of disasters with Ln (|Ln|=|E|) is the set of binary values lnij (which is 1 if link (i, 
j) is disconnected by disaster n, and 0 otherwise), probability of disaster n (pn), probability of damage by 
disaster n (pd
n).
Binary variables:
 Rtn (Btn) = 1 if the primary (backup) path of connection t is down in case of event n, otherwise 0.
 Rijt (Bijt) = 1 if the primary (backup) path of connection t traverses link (i, j), otherwise 0.
 Ztn = 1 if connection t (on both primary and backup) is down in case of event n, otherwise 0.
Constraints:
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Eq. (3)-(5) are for primary path and equations for backup path can be written by replacing R by B. Eq. (3)-(6) are 
required to make sure that Zt
n is 1 if both primary and backup path of connection t are disconnected by disaster n. 
Eq. (7) is required to make sure that primary and backup path are disjoint and Eq. (8) is link-capacity constraint. We 
also have flow-conservation constraints for both primary and backup paths where the equations are omitted due to 
the space limitation.
4. Probability of Disaster and Probability of Damage
The probability of a disaster and probability of damage are disaster-dependent. Here, we give two examples: a 
natural disaster (earthquake) and a man-made disaster (weapons of mass destruction (WMD) attacks). For an 
earthquake, seismic hazard maps indicate the probability of an earthquake and show different seismic hazard levels. 
The probability of damage depends on these seismic hazard levels. In [8], Grünthal explains how to provide damage 
curves for different seismic hazard levels. By using seismic hazard maps and damage curves, we can obtain the 
probability of damage of different hazard levels which indicates on which regions we should focus. For WMD 
attack, we can estimate the possible targets (populated cities, capitals, etc.) and we can have probability of attack 
proportional to the importance and/or population of target. The probability of damage, on the other hand, is close to 
1 since these attacks are very destructive and intense.
5. Illustrative Numerical Examples
We show some illustrative numerical examples on US-wide Wavelength Division Multiplexing (WDM) network 
(NSFNet) shown in Fig. 1 with 32 wavelengths/link in each direction with wavelength conversion. In Fig. 1, we 
match physical NSFNet topology (obtained by matching NSFNet with transportation map where we assume that
fiber links are close to highways since they should be accessible in case of a failure) with US seismic hazard map [9] 
with 2% probability of exceedance in 50 years (pn=0.02). We compute the probability of damage for different hazard 
levels and we neglect the hazard levels below 32% because of limited to no damage. Ref. [10] shows us that the 
damage of an earthquake may span up to 96 km. Thus, we draw a circle with 96 km radius and circulate it in the 
considered areas; we obtain 11 distinct shared risk groups (shown in Fig. 1). We also consider that an earthquake on 
a fault line can trigger other earthquakes on the same line (i.e., correlated failures). We obtain the traffic demand
such that connection requests are proportional to the populations of source and destination [11]. We assign 
connections different ct values: 10α, 5α, 3α, and α with the distribution 1: 2: 3: 4 where the number of connections 
with high penalty is less than the others. α is some value to parameterize the penalty (e.g., penalty per hour). 
Disaster Zone
Figure 1. NSFNet representative physical topology and US seismic hazard map with disaster zones
Table I. Risk Reduction and Increase in Resources
Initial Traffic Value (Tbps) [11] 3 3.5 4 4.5 5 5.5 6 6.5 7
Risk Reduction 5.57% 4.60% 6.59% 2.72% 6.29% 4.04% 4.67% 6.38% 3.74%
Increase in Resources 4.76% 6.36% 8.15% 8.22% 8.93% 10.16% 10.27% 10.79% 16.52%
We compare our approach, disaster risk-aware provisioning (D-RAP), to an approach which aims to minimize 
resource occupation with 1+1 protection (where connections are provisioned over link-disjoint primary and backup 
path), which we called minR. Table I shows risk reduction and increase in resources of D-RAP compared to minR. 
Results show that our approach reduces the risk by up to 6.5%. Risk reduction results in increasing in resources up 
to 16.5%. We explore the penalty with a case study where we have an earthquake in San Diego area (shown with an 
arrow in Fig. 1) where the initial traffic value [11] to generate traffic is 7 Tbps. Assume that recovery time is one 
week after disaster (hr = 168 hrs.) and allowed down time for a connection is 2 days (h
t
adt = 48 hrs). In this case, our 
approach decreases penalty paid by network operator by 4,140α, where α is penalty per hour.
We also have illustrative numerical examples for WMD attacks where we obtain 5.5% risk reduction with 20% 
increase in resources. We omit the details due to the space limitation.
References:
[1] S. Neumayer, G. Zussman, R. Cohen, and E. Modiano, “Assessing the Vulnerability of Fiber Infrastructure to Disasters,” in Proc. IEEE 
INFOCOM, Brazil, April 2009.
[2] Y. Ran, “Considerations and Suggestions on Improvement of Communication Network Disaster Countermeasures after the Wenchuan 
Earthquake,” IEEE Communication Magazine, vol. 49, no. 1, pp. 44-47, January 2011.
[3] P. K. Agarwal, A. Efrat, S. Ganjugunte, D. Hay, S. Sankararaman, and G. Zussman, “The Resilience of WDM Networks to Probabilistic 
Geographical Failures,” in Proc. IEEE INFOCOM, Shangai, China, April 2011.
[4] X. Wang, X. Jiang, and A. Pattavina, “Assessing Network Vulnerability under Probabilistic Region Failure Model,” in Proc. IEEE HPSR, 
Cartegana, Spain, July 2011.
[5] S. Banerjee, S. Shirazipourazad, and A. Sen, “Design and Analysis of Networks with Large Components in Presence of Region-Based 
Faults,” in Proc. IEEE ICC, Kyoto, Japan, June 2011.
[6] S. E. Chang, M. Shinozuka, and J.E. Moore, “Probabilistic Eartquake Scenarios: Extending Risk Analysis Methodologies to Spatially 
Distributed Systems,” Earthquake Spectra, vol. 16, no. 3, August 2000.
[7]  S. Kaplan and B. J. Garrick, “On the Quantitative Definition of Risk,” Risk Analysis, vol. 1, no. 1, 1981. 
[8]  G. Grünthal, “Europan Macroseismic Scale 1998 (EMS-98),”Cahiers du Centre Europeen de Geodynamique et de Seismologie, vol. 15, 
Luxembourg, 1998.
[9]  US Geological Survey, “2008 Hazard Map,” <http://earthquake.usgs.gov/hazards/products/graphic2pct50.jpg>.
[10]  T. L. Weems, “How far is far enough,” Disaster Recovery Journal, vol. 16, no. 2, Spring 2003.
[11] M. Batayneh, D.A. Schupke, M. Hoffman, A. Kristaedter, and B. Mukherjee, “On Routing and Transmission-Range Determination of Multi-
Bit-Rate Signals over Mixed-Line-Rate WDM Optical Networks for Carrier Ethernet,” IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking, 2011
